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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (k) .

This is a final

appeal from an Order of the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Davis County, Utah the Honorable Rodney Page
presiding.

That final judgment dismissed with prejudice the

personal injury claim of Joanna Banford.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did Banford fully comply with the notice of claim
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by serving
the Notice of Claim upon Kaysville's City Finance Director?
2. Was the complaint filed timely as required by the
Governmental Immunity Act?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal involve legal conclusions by the
trial court.

Those legal conclusions will be given no

deference by this Court and will be reviewed for legal
correctness. T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The interpretations of the following statutory
provisions are determinative of the issues on appeal.

1

The

language of these designated statutes are set out in the
Addendum to this Appellant's Brief, pursuant to Rule 24 (f)
(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15
Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-7
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case

This is a personal injury claim, alleging that the City
of Kaysville is negligent through the doctrine of Respondeat
Superior, and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of Joanna Banford's and her daughter Amber's injuries,
sustained in an automobile collision with David Quinley, a
Kaysville City Police Officer, on February 18, 1995.
B-

Course of Proceedings

The complaint was filed in the Second Judicial District
Court on February 18, 1997.

On June 19, 1997, Defendants

Kaysville City Corp., David Quinley and Kaysville City
Police Department, moved the court to dismiss the action for
lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13
(1953), as amended.

The court in its ruling on December 17,

1997 dismissed the appellant's complaint for failing to
2

comply with Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et. seq. (1953), as
amended.
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court

Honorable Rodney Page, Second District Court Judge,
granted defendant/appellees Motion to Dismiss on December
17, 1997.
D•

Statement of Facts

1.

Joanna Banford was the driver of a vehicle

involved in an accident on February 18, 1995 in Davis County
with her daughter, Amber Banford, as a passenger. (R. 31-82
Pg. 1 1 1)
2.

The second vehicle in the collision was driven by

David Quinley, a Kaysville City Police Officer, who was on
duty at the time of the collision.

Officer David Quinley

ran a stop sign and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle.
(R. 31-82 Pg. 1-2 f2)
3.

The Banford's retained Kenneth L. Sondgeroth, attorney

at law of Bullhead City, Arizona in late April/May 1995. (R.
31-82 Pg. 2 f 3)
4.

In early April 1995, Brian Jensen, a long time

companion of Joanna Banford, attempted to assist in getting
Ms. Banford's medical bills paid that were in excess of her
own no-fault benefits.

Through phone calls, Mr. Jensen

spoke to Art Johnson, the mayor of Kaysville City, David
Helquist, the Chief of Police of Kaysville City and finally
3

Dean Storey, Kaysville City Finance Director.

Mr. Storey

instructed Mr. Jensen to contact Reliance Insurance and
shortly thereafter Clay Stephens, the adjuster for Reliance
Insurance, contacted Ms. Banford by telephone.

At the time

of the conversations with Mr. Stephens, the Banfords did not
have legal counsel. (R. 31-82, pg. 2 ^4)
5.

Clay Stephens kept in contact for some time after

this initial conversation with Joanna Banford and told her
to not worry about the bills and to concentrate on her
medical recovery from the injuries sustained in the
accident.

He indicated to her that "their client was at

fault" and that the matter could be settled. (R. 31-82, Pg.

2 115)
6.

Clay Stephens continued to contact Joanna Banford

in an attempt to settle these matters despite being told
plaintiff had retained counsel and, at one point, Clay
Stephens stated there was no need for attorneys as this case
could have been settled without attorneys getting involved.
(R.31-82, Pg. 2 H 6)
7.

In subsequent telephone conversations with Joanna

Banford, Mr. Stephens attempted to settle the case of Amber
Banford and offered the sum of $12,000.00, less $3,000.00
no-fault medical benefits with the Banford1s being
responsible for all other outstanding medical bills and any

4

remaining funds would be put in a court approved trust
account for the benefit of Amber. (R. 31-82, Pg. 2 ^6)
8.

On July 12, 1995, plaintiff by and through her

attorney Kenneth L. Sondgeroth, sent a letter to "Kaysville
City Corporation re: personal injury of Joanna Banford and
Amber Banford; Date of accident: 2/18/95."

This letter was

directed to "To whom it may concern: We represent Joanna
Banford and Amber Banford in their claim for personal
injuries sustained in the automobile collision of February
18, 1995.

David J. Qumley was driving a vehicle which you

owned that was involved in the accident."

The letter

further went on to request the name of Kaysville City's
insurance carrier and to notify their insurance carrier of
the accident. (R. 31-82, Pg. 3 fl 7)
9.

Pursuant to this letter of July 12, 1995, Dean G.

Storey, Finance Director of Kaysville City, responded on
July 25, 1995.

The letter gave Mr. Sondgeroth the name and

address of Kaysville City's insurance carrier, Reliance
Insurance Company, the city attorney, and the irsurance
agent for Kaysville City.

This letter closed with the line,

"Please contact me as the city representative." (R. 31-82,
Pg. 3 U8)
10.

On November 16, 1995 Kenneth L. Sondgeroth wrote

directly to Dean Storey, Kaysville City finance director.
The main thrust of this letter was the contacts as outlined
5

above with Clay Stephens, the adjuster for Reliance.

Also

in this letter, Mr. Sondgeroth stated:
"As you are aware, my office represents both Joanna and
Amber Banford in their claims that arose from a vehicle
accident with a member of your police force. Clearly,
as is evident from the police report, the police
officer was grossly negligent and that my clients were
nothing but innocent victims... Joanna Banford
underwent radical surgery which, while relatively
successful, still leaves her quite permanently
disabled."
Mr. Sondgeroth!s letter further went on:
"Mrs. Banford has incurred significant medical bills as
a result of this accident. Some of the bills were paid
by her own auto coverage, but significant portions were
not . . . Mrs. Banford's injuries for her shattered
knee are in excess of $750,000.00.
Amber Banford was the minor who sustained head injuries
in this accident. She continues to suffer from
dizziness and other symptoms of head trauma. Mr.
Stephens has already made an offer on her damages
without knowing the full extent of damages she has
incurred.
I know that the mayor of your city has spoken to my
clients. He appeared concerned that they be treated
well . . . I believe that your city has some influence
on Reliance Insurance with respect to the party
negotiating on your behalf." (R. 31-82, Pg. 3-4 ^9)
11.

On February 28, 1996, Letisa McKenzie sent a

letter to Mr. Sondgeroth stating:
"Please be advised that I have taken over the handling
of the above captioned matter. At your earliest
convenience I request that you forward copies of your
clients medical specials including bills and reports.
If your clients are making claims for lost wages, I
would also request that forwarding documentation as
well. I look forward to working with you on this
matter." See attached exhibit 7. (Emphasis added)
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A similar follow-up letter was sent to Mr. Sondgeroth
from Ms. McKenzie on April 2, 1996. (R. 31-82, Pg. 4 f10)
12.

During this time period plaintiffs continued to

receive medical care and treatment.

The final reports were

obtained from treating physicians and complete settlement
brochures on the plaintiffs were prepared and submitted to
Reliance Insurance in January, 1997. (R. 31-82, Pg. 4-5 ^[11)
13.

The complaint in this case was filed February 18,

1997. (R. 31-82, Pg. 5 f 13)
14.

By way of letter of April 30, 1997, Reliance

Insurance, by and through Letisa McKenzie, denied any and
all claims of the plaintiff due to the failure to give
notice as required under Utah's Governmental Immunity Act.
That letter was followed by the defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, filed by the defendants on
June 19, 1997. (R. 31-82, Pg. 5 f 14)
15.

In the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,

the defendants claimed that the notice to the governmental
entity had not been filed in a timely manner and, even if
said notice was sufficient under the statute, the complaint
against the governmental entity was not filed in a timely
manner. (R. 14-30 Pg. 3-7)
16.

The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition on

July 18, 1997 (R. 31-82) with a reply being submitted by the
defense on August 8, 1997. (R. 83-93)
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Oral argument was

then held and Judge Page wished for further clarification on
conflicts between the three day mailing rule of URCP and one
day notice of claim pursuant to UCA 63-37-1 (notice of claim
deemed filed on same date it is mailed).

The plaintiffs

then filed a response memorandum to this October 17, 1997
letter on October 22, 1997. (R. 99-116)
17.

On December 17, 1997 the trial court issued a

ruling on defendants motion to dismiss.

The trial court

stated that the letter to Dean Storey, city finance director
of Kaysville, "substantially complied with the notice
requirements of section 63-30-11 of the Governmental
Immunity Act."

The trial court then went to the question on

whether plaintiffs' complaint was filed in a timely manner.
The trial court stated:
"The Court, therefore concludes that the Plaintiffs'
complaint was not filed within the one year period as
required by the Governmental Immunity Act, that does
not resolve the case. Plaintiffs have raised an issue
of estoppel as a result of the alleged actions of the
insurance carrier for the city, and the court concludes
that there are questions of fact and issues raised on
that issue which preclude the court from granting
defendants' motion to dismiss at this time." (R. 117121)
18.

On January 14, 1998 a motion for reconsideration

was filed by plaintiffs that included affidavits from
attorney Sondgeroth and Jean Ascivedo, Mr. Sondgeroth's
secretary, concerning actual dates that the letter of
November 16, 1997 was mailed to the city of Kaysville. (R.
141)

8

19.

On January 27, 1998 defendants filed a motion to

alter judgments or amend judgment and motion to strike
affidavits of Sondgeroth and Ascivedo and accompanying
memorandum. (R. 156-158)

A reply was then filed February 9,

1998 by plaintiffs. (R. 174-181)
20.

On April 24, 1998 the "Ruling on Plaintiff's

Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling on Motion to Dismiss"
was issued by the court relying on Larsen vs. Park City,
decided March 27, 1998 by the Utah Supreme Court, 339 UAR 17
published March 31, 1998.

The trial court below stated that

the Larsen case clarified the Governmental Immunity Act.
Kaysville is a third class city and, under the statute, the
city council of such a city must be given actual notice of
the claim.

To further clarify its ruling, this Court stated

that, "no claim was filed with the governing body as
required by statute and case law in the one year period and
the claim is barred and the court was without jurisdiction."
(R. 189-193)
21.

The court further went on to state that there

were no grounds for plaintiffs' claim of equitable estoppel
or waiver of the notice requirements and that the complaint
was dismissed with prejudice. (R. 189-193)

Findings and

Judgment were submitted by the defendant to the court for
signature.

That Judgme nt was signed on May 26, 1998 and

docketed on June 2, 1998. (R. 194-196)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Banfora has fully complied with the notice provisions
of the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act.

The November 16,

1995 letter satisfies those notice requirements.

The facts

of this case, as well as Utah Case law, support that the
individuals
the

served are appropriate parties to serve

statute

and

represent

those

with

under

authority

to

administer, control, direct, and manage the affairs of the
City of Kaysville.

All purposes of the notice provisions of

the Act have been satisfied in this case.

The Julyl2, 1995

letter addressed to "Kaysville City Corporation", along with
the notice of claim letter addressed to the Dean Storey, the
Kaysville

City

Finance

Director,

allowed

the

appropriate

governmental entities to investigate and evaluate the claim.
The

insurance

adjuster

for

the

city

contacted

the

appellants, informal discovery had commenced, and settlement
negotiations

had

begun.

The

trial

court's

order

of

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, subverted the purposes of the
Act.
Upon compliance with the notice provisions of the Utah
Governmental

Immunity

Act,

appellants

did

file

their

complaint within the statutory one year period provided in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (2).

In computing the time under

the Act, Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-7 are the controlling authority.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BANFORD FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE
OF CLAIM PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Before addressing the City's specific allegations of
how Banford's notice of claim filing was defective, a review
of the purpose of the notice requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act ("Act") is important.

As stated by the Utah

Supreme Court in Gallegos v. Midvale, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972),
the notice requirements of the Act are designed "to alert the
public authority so that a proper and timely investigation of
the claim can be made."

I_d. at 1337.

The City cannot argue

that purpose was not accomplished in this case.

In April

1995, Brian Jensen, a long time companion of Joanna Banford,
attempted to assist Joanna in getting all of her bills paid
that were above and beyond her own no-fault benefits.

In

doing so, Mr. Jensen made phone calls to the mayor of
Kaysville, the Chief of Police and the City Finance Director.
Shortly thereafter, Dean G. Storey, the City Finance Director
contacted Mr. Jensen and instructed him to call Clay
Stephens, the city insurance carrier's adjuster.

Clay

Stephens ended up contacting Mr. Jensen and indicated that
"their client was at fault," and that the matter could be
settled.

On July 12, 1995, appellee, by and through her
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attorney Kenneth L. Sondgeroth, sent a letter to "Kaysville
City Corporation."

This letter addressed to whom it may

concern, identified appellees counsel and gave notice of the
accident and injuries sustained as a result of that accident
by Joanna and Amber Banford.

Pursuant to that letter, Dean

G. Storey, the Finance Director of Kaysville City, responded
on July 25, 1995, divulging the name of the City's insurance
carrier, the city attorney and the insurance agent.

The

responding letter closed with the line "Please contact me as
the city representative."

Clearly, the correspondence and

the exchange of information including the July 12, 1995
letter to "Kaysville City Corporation" and the response by
the City Finance Director is evidence of the Notice of Claim
and the investigation conducted by the City.

In Scarborough

v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), the
Supreme Court stated that full compliance with the
requirements of the notice of claim statute consists of:
Prior to filing suite, a claim
must be filed which (1) is in writing,
(2) states the facts and the nature of
the claim,
(3) is signed by the
claimant,
(4) is directed and delivered
to someone authorized to receive it, and
(5) has been filed within the prescribed
time.
Banford fully complied with those provisions both in the July
12, 1995 letter her then attorney Sondgeroth wrote to
"Kaysville City Corporation", and in a November 16, 1995
letter written directly to Dean Storey, as the "city
12

representative", which clearly outlined the Banford's claims
against the city.

Each of those documents was in writing.

Each stated the facts and nature of the Banford's claims.
The Banford's attorney signed both letters.

Both documents

were mailed and received by Mr. Storey, who had previously
represented on numerous occasions to Joanna Banford and ner
representatives that he was the "city's representative" and
should be contacted as such.
Joanna Banford has fully complied with the notice of
claim requirements of the Act.

The trial court was correct

in its ruling on December 17, 1997 denying the City's Motion
to Dismiss, stating that the letter to Dean Storey, city
finance director of Kaysville, "substantially complied with
the notice requirements of section 63-30-11 of the
Governmental Immunity Act" .
A.

Banford Has Complied With The Act By
Serving The Notice Of Claim Upon Dean
Storey, City Finance Director.

The City does not argue that Banford is guilty of no
compliance with the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code
Ann. §63-30-13.

The City argues defective compliance with

the notice of claim requirements because the Notice of Claim
was not filed with the "governing body" of the City.

Banford

served her Notice of Claim upon Dean Storey, City Finance
Director.

The City argues that service on this individual

13

cannot be deemed service on the "governing body" of the
political subdivision.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 provides that a claim against
a political subdivision is barred unless notice of claim "is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
within one year after the claim arises. . . . "

Decisions of

this Court and Utah statutes support that, under the
circumstances of this case, Banford has satisfied the notice
of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13.

Utah Code

Ann. §68-3-2 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The rule of the common law that statutes
in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the
statutes of this state.
The statutes
establish
the
laws
of
the
state
respecting the subjects to which they
relate, and their provisions and all
proceedings
under
them
are
to
be
liberally
construed with a view
to
effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice.
Nowhere in the Governmental Immunity Act is the term
"governing body" of a political subdivision defined.

The

City attempts to use a definition of "governing body" set
forth in the Utah Municipal Code, Utah Code Ann. §10-1-101 et
seq.

Utah Code Ann. §10-1-104, however, makes it clear that

the definition of "governing body" is limited to "as used in
this act".

Nowhere in the Utah Municipal Code or in the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act has the legislature stated that the
definition of "governing body" in the Utah Municipal Act is

14

applied when construing the term "governing body" as it
applies to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Certainly, 1

the legislature had intended for that definition to apply, 1
could easily have said so.

The legislature could just as

easily have defined "governing body" in the Governmental
Immunity Act itself.

The legislature has not done that.

In

that regard, this case is most similar to the decision of
this Court in Brittain v. State of Utah, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
In Brittain, the plaintiff pursued claims against the
Utah Department of Employment Security and the Utah Division
of Facilities, Construction, and Management.

Brittain filed

notices of claim under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 with the
Attorney General and the Division of Risk Management.

The

State filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Brittain
had failed to file a notice of claim with either the
Department of Employment Security or the Division of
Facilities, Construction, and Management, as required by the
Governmental Immunity Act.

The statute provides that a

notice of claim be filed with the Attorney General and "the
agency concerned".

Addressing that issue, this Court stated

Because the term "agency concerned" is
not clear on its face, we uill interpret
the notice requirement of section 63-3012 m
a manner consistent with the
overall purpose of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. As explained by the Utah
Supreme Court lf[i]t is necessary to
consider
the policy
of
the
notice

15

requirement so that in any particular
case the facts can be evaluated to
determine if the intent of the statute
has been accomplished."
Stahl v. Utah
Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 482
(Utah 1980) .
The primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible
public authorities an opportunity to
pursue a proper and timely investigation
of the merits of a claim and to arrive
at a timely settlement, if appropriate,
thereby
avoiding
the
expenditure
of
public
revenue
for
costly
and
unnecessary
litigation."
(Citations
omitted).
Id. at 668.
Like the term "governing body", the term "agency
concerned" in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 is not defined in the
statute.

This Court turned to the commonly understood

dictionary meaning, "interested" and concluded that the
statutory notice of claim requirement was met by filing
notice "with any one of potentially several agencies with a
legitimate interest in plaintiff's claim and the legal
proceedings which might result therefrom."

I_d. at 668.

In an important final paragraph, in language directly
applicable to the facts of this case on appeal, this Court
concluded:
Finally, we wish to reiterate that this
is not a case where the notice of claim
was
defective
in
form
or
content.
Recognizing the need for written notice
to protect against the unreliability of
memory,
the
notice
of
claim
was
preserved
in
writing,
accurately
recording
Brittain's
account
of
the

16

accident. This is also not a case where
plaintiff either gave no notice or filed
only one of two required notices .
Finally, this is not a case where notice
of claim was not filed within the oneyear period.
It is undisputed that
plaintiff sent both notices well within
one year from the date his claim arose.
Id. at 669
While there are some factual differences between this
case and the Brittam case, the reasoning of that case
controls these facts.
The major difference between this case and the Brittam
case is that this case involves a claim against a political
subdivision, as opposed to a claim against the State.

The

language of the Act requires that when pursuing a claim
against a political subdivision, the notice of claim is to be
filed "with the governing body of the political subdivision."
As mentioned before, the term "governing body" is not defined
in the Act.

Common dictionary meaning of the word "govern"

includes the terms "administer", "direct", "control", and
"manage".

Websters New World Dictionary, Second College

Edition, p.604 (1979).
Just as a corporation can only act through individuals,
service upon any "governing body" must be made upon an
individual.

In this case, service was made on Dean Storey,

the City Finance Director.

Certainly, service upon this

individual and the city he claimed he represented constitutes
service on those with power to administer, direct, control,
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and manage the interests of the City and, specifically, with
regard to this personal injury claim.

In a letter dated July

25, 1995, to Banford's then attorney Mr. Sondgeroth, Mr.
Storey states in the closing line "Please contact me as the
city representative."
It is clear from that correspondence that Mr. Storey
had been assigned responsibility for this claim by the City
and was acting as their authorized agent.

Banford was

instructed to direct all correspondence to Mr. Storey, as
agent for the political subdivisions.
The facts and circumstances of Banford's service of the
Notice of Claim, coupled with the reasoning of this Court in
Brittam, make it clear that Banford's Notice of Claim
service satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-3013.

The trial court's denial of the Cityfs Motion to Dismiss

on December 17, 1997 should be reinstated and its granting of
the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Court's Ruling on Motion
to Dismiss should be overruled.
POINT II
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT BANFORD'S NOVEMBER 16,
1995 CORRESPONDENCE CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF CLAIM,
THE COMPLAINT WAS THEN FILED TIMELY AS REQUIRED BY
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
A.

Banford's complaint was timely filed under U.C.A.
68-3-7 and rule 6 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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The statutes the defendant/appellee claim are
dispositive as to the issue of whether the complaint was
timely filed, are U.C.A. 63-30-14 and 63-30-15.

Pu-suant to

§ 63-30-14,
[w]ithm ninety days of the filing of a claim
the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier shall act thereon and notify the
claimant in writing of its approval or
denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been
denied if at the end of the ninety-day period
the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier has failed to approve or deny the
claim.
and U.C.A. 63-30-15 (2),
[t]he claimant shall begin the action within
one year after denial of the claim or within
one year after the denial period specified in
this chapter has expired, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to
the claim is characterized as governmenta1.
The appellee here argues that if this court finds that
the letter of November 16, 1995 is m

compliance with the

notice of claim to the city of Kaysville, the appellee
failed to deny the claim within the ninety days as required
by U.C.A. 63-30-14, therefore requiring the appellants to
file their complaint by February 13, 1997.

Although ninety

days from the November 16, 1995 letter is February 13, 1996,
the appellant argues that U.C.A. 63-30-14 must be read in
conjuntion with U.C.A. 68-3-7 along with rule 6 (e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 68-3-7,

[t]he time in which any act provided by law
is to be done is computed by excluding the
first day and including the last, unless the

19

last is a
excluded.

holiday,

and

then

it

is

also

Under rule 6 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
[w]henever a party has the right or is
required
to do some act or take
some
proceedings within a prescribed period after
the service of a notice or other paper upon
him and the notice or paper is served upon
him by mail, three (3) days shall be added to
the prescribed period.
Since the November 16, 1995 letter was mailed to the
City of Kaysville Finance Director, the city of Kaysville
was provided with an additional three days from the ninetyday date in which to deny the claim, under rule 6(e) of the
Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Since the letter was mailed

on November 16, 1995, the ninety day period of denial would
lapse on February 14, 1996, under U.C.A. 68-3-7, but the
appellee would be given an additional three days within
which to make its denial under URCP 6(e), extending the date
to February 17, 1996.

Thus, commencing the one-year period

under U.C.A. 63-30-15 on February 17, 1996 and requiring
that the complaint be filed on or before February 17, 1997.
Rule 6 (e) URCP is not a discretionary rule but
mandates that three (3) days shall be added to a prescribed
period.

In Utah Chiropractic Associations Inc. v. Equitable

Life Assurance Society of the United States, 579 P.2d 1327
(Utah 1978), the court ruled that a party had one (1) month
and three (3) days from the date an order was mailed in
which to file a Petition for Review of the Insurance
20

Commissioner's decision.

The court cited rule 6 (e) word

for word and thereafter added three (3) days time for the
appellate filing.

In

Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.

Utah Department of Transportation, 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1978)
the court followed the decision in Utah Chiropractic
Associations, Inc. and ruled that the under URCP 6 (e),
three days would be added to the time in which the litigant
would be required to act when the Commission's decision was
served by mail.

(See also,

Mickleson v. Shelly, 542 P.2d

740 where the court stated "our rules of civil procedure
provide that when notice is required and is given by
mailing, three (3) extra days must be included in the
required time.")(Emphasis added)
Finally in Disciplinary Action of McCune, 717 P.2D 701,
708 (Utah 1986) the court disallowed a claim by McCune that
he had not received proper notice as this mailing time was
not added to the notice of hearing.

However, the court

stated, "however, McCune did not object at the time of the
hearing to the notice he received.

He thereby waived his

right to object, especially since he has shown no prejudice
resulting from a shortened time period."
Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that
the rules " . . .

shall be liberally construed to serve the

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."

Relying upon McCune, appellants have not waived
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the additional three (3) days mailing period to the ninety
(90) day period required for an answer from the defendants.
By denying the appellants this time would cause prejudice
and a great inequity against the appellants, allowing
party's to use Rule 6 (e) as a discretionary double edged
sword, accepted and rejected at their whim.

As shown in

this case, Rule 6 (e) could be used to extend the ninety day
rule by allowing the city of Kaysville to argue they had an
additional three days to deny the claim or, as better served
to justify their position, choose not to add an additional
three days and argue untimely filing.

In any sense, the

reasoning behind the purpose of Rule 6 (e) , to avoid
confusion in the litigation process, would be circumvented.
Rule 6 (e) is not in conflict with 63-30-14, and is a rules
standard all attorneys must be able to rely upon to create
order amid the chaos of litigation.

This court should rule

that Rule 6 (e) had extended the appellees ninety-day denial
date by three additional days making the date of denial
February 17, 1996.
Since February 17, 1997 was a state and federal
holiday, and the complaint was filed by the appellants on
February 18, 1997, they had timely filed within the
statutory time period.
B.

Banford's complaint was timely filed even if the
court finds that Rule 6(e) is inapplicable to this
case.
22

The appellees argue and the lower court's decision was
based upon U.C.A. 63-37-1, stating:
[a]ny report, claim, tax return, statement or
other document or any payment required or
authorized to be filed or made to the state
of Utah, or to any political subdivision
thereof, which is:
(1) Transmitted through the United States
Mail, shall be deemed filed or made and
received
by
the
state
or
political
subdivisions on the sate shown by the postoffice cancellation mark stamped upon the
envelope
or
other
appropriate
wrapper
containing it.
and U.C.A. 63-30-15 (2), which states in part, "[t]he
claimant shall begin the action within one

year after denial

of the claim or within one year after the denial period
specified in this chapter has expired . . ." (Emphasis
added)

Pursuant to these statutes, the appellees argue, and

the lower court held, that U.C.A. 63-37-1 was the applicable
statute governing the date of filing the letter of November
16, 1995.

The Notice of Claim was deemed to be filed on

November 16, 1995, requiring the appellants to file their
complaint within ninety days and one year, or February 13,
1997.
To refute this argument, the appellants submitted
affidavits from appellants' originally retained attorney,
Kenneth L. Sondgeroth and Regina Acevedo, the secretary for
the law office of Kenneth L. Sondgeroth.

These affidavits

were provided as evidence of Mr. Sondgeroth's office mailing
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procedure.

Pursuant to office procedure, the mail was

picked up and delivered to his office in between the hours
of 9:00 am and 10:00 am every day.

Mr. Sondgeroth's

affidavit also explained his practice for the typing and
signing of letters to be mailed.

Since Mr. Songeroth's mail

was picked up in the morning, any letters dated for a
specific day were signed by him at the end of each day and
mailed the following morning.

Ms. Acevedo's affidavit also

explained the regular office procedure for mailing letters.
In appellee's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter Findings or Amend
Judgment, they cite to Lister v. Utah Valley Community
College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1994) to strike the
affidavits of Mr. Sondgeroth and Ms. Acevado.

In Lister,

the plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence.

The

defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging failure to
serve the notice of claim upon the Attorney General as
mandated by U.C.A. s 63-30-12 and filed an affidavit of the
Lead secretary of the Litigation Division of the Utah
Attorney Generals Office which established that no notice of
claim had been served upon the Attorney General.

The

plaintiff responded by filing an affidavit from his attorney
in which claimed that it was his standard office practice to
mail notices of claims to the Attorney General's Office.
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He

provided no specific evidence that this notice was ever
mailed to the Attorney General's office.
The

appellees

argument

is

that

these

affidavits

established only office routmr as to review the letter at
the end of the day and place it in the outgoing mail box,
which

was

then

picked

up

me

following

morning.

Under

Lister, the appellees argue tne affidavits are not competent
because neither Sondgeroth nor his secretary testified that
they had personal knowledge of the exact time they placed
the letter in the mail.

The appellees argue t hat it is

just as likely that the letter could have been dictated and
signed

the

day

before

or

the morning

and

mailed

in

the

morning pickup on the 16th.
Lister is distinguishable form the underlying facts in
this appeal.

In Lister, the Litigation Division of the Utah

Attorney

General's

controls

all

office,

notices

of

the

office

claim

that

received

claimed that no notice of claim was ever
of

Lister

by

the

Utah

Attorney

by

maintains
the

and

office,

received on behalf

General's

office.

The

affidavits were than provided to prove that the notice of
claim

was

affidavits,

actually
cited

mailed.

Utah

The

court

in

Code Ann. § 63-37-1

striking
stating

the

"[I]n

this case, there is no evidence concerning the postmark or
the date of mailing.

There is nothing from counsel or his

secretary that state that a notice was in fact filed." Id.
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at 935.
was

in

Finance

Unlike in Lister, the appellant's notice of claim
fact

mailed

Director,

and

Dean

received

Storey.

by
The

the

Kaysville

affidavits

provided to prove that the notice of claim was ever
they are provided to prove the time of mailing.

City

were

not

mailed,
Therefore

they are competent evidence of Sondgeroth's office mailing
policy and should not have been stricken by the lower court.

If the court finds that the notice of claim letter
dated November 16, 1995, was deemed filed on November 17,
1995, and that the appellees had until February 14, 1996
within which to deny the appellants claim (90 days after the
mailing of the notice) , the one year period provided for in
§63-30-15 does not begin to run until February 15, 1996.
Accordingly, the appellants then had until February 15, 1997
within which to file their complaint.

Since February 15,

1997 was a Saturday, and February 17, 1997 was a state and
federal holiday, the time within which the appellants had to
file their complaint was extended until Tuesday, February
18, 1997, when the complaint was, in fact, filed.
CONCLUSION
Appellants complied with the applicable sections of the
Utah Code by making and maintaining numerous contacts with
official representatives of the Appellee.
fact, timely filed a Notice of Claim.
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The Appellants in

The Appellants complied with the applicable sections of
the Utah Code by timely filing their complaint, within one
year from the date that any denial of their claim could be
implied under the statute.
DATED this 2*t~s

day of December, 1998.
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ONARD E. McGEE
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby
certify tnat
that AAPPELLANT'S
>y certity
F F U L L A N T ' S MMEMORANDUM
^ M U K A N U U M OF
ut POINTS
AND AUTHORITI
'IES was hand-delivered this

day of

December, 1998, to the following counsel of record:
Harry Souval
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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The Appellants complied with the applicable sections of
the Utah Code by timely filing their complaint, within one
year from the date that any denial of their claim could be
implied under the statute.
DATED this 2-*~>s

da

Y

of

December, 1998.

LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ONARD E. McGEE
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES was hand-delivered this

day of

December, 1998, to the following counsel of record:
Harry Souval
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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ADDENDUM

Page 1
tation/Title
ST § 68-3-2, Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed--Rules of equity
evail

1

tah Code § 68-3-2
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 68. STATUTES
CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTION
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

58-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed—Rules of equity prevail
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes of
is state The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they reiate, and their provisions and all
Dceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice
henever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same matter the rules
equity shall prevail

arch this disc for cases citing this section

Copyright (c) West Group 1998

No claim to original U S

Govt

works

Page i
Lon/Title
§ 63-30-13, Claim against political subdivision or its employee--Time for filing notice.
ode § 63-30-13

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
3-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee—Time for filing notice.
laim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of
jloyee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with
erning body of the political subdivision according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim
3r before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.

I by Laws 1987, c. 75; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 3, eff. May 4, 1998.

this disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 1998

No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

Page
Ltation/Title
r ST § 63-30-14, Claim for injury--Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance
arrier within ninety days
tah Code § 63-30-14

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

63-30-14. Claim for injury-Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within ninety day
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the
aimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period
ie governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.

> enacted by Chapter 139, Laws of Utah 1965

earch this disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 1998

No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

Page J.
.on/Title
§ 63-30-15, Denial of claim for injury--Authority and time for filing action against
Lmental entity

ode § 63-30-15
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is pro ided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

1-15. Denial of claim for injury—Authority and time for filing action against governmental entity
[f the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the governmental entity or an
se of the entity.
The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period
d in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
nental.

tended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987

his disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 1998

No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

Page
tation/Title
ST § 63-37-1, When postmark date deemed filing date--When mailing date deemed filing date

1

tah Code § 63-37-1

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 37. MAILING REPORTS, CLAIMS, RETURNS, STATEMENTS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS TO STATE OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

63-37-1. When postmark date deemed filing date—When mailing date deemed filing date
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to the
ate of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which is:
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall be deemed filed or made and received by the state or political
lbdivisions on the date shown by the post-office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate wrapper
Dntaining it.
(2) Mailed but not received by the state or political subdivisions where received and the cancellation mark is illegible,
rroneous, or omitted, shall be deemed filed or made and received on the date it was mailed if the sender establishes by
ompetent evidence that the report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or payment was deposited in the United State
mil on or before the date for filing or paying; and in cases of such nonreceipt of any such report, tax return, statement, or othei
ocument required by law to be filed, the sender files with the state or political subdivision a duplicate within thirty days after
written notification is given to the sender by the state or political subdivisions of its nonreceipt of such report, tax return,
tatement, or other document.

s enacted by Chapter 179, Laws of Utah 1967

iearch this disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 1998

No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

Page 1"
Ion/Title
§ 68-3-7, Time, how computed
ode § 68-3-7

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 68. STATUTES
CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTION
(Information regarding effective dates, repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

7. Time, how computed
time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless
is a holiday, and then it also is excluded.
his disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 1998

No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

GENERAL PROVISIONS
rffigtory: C. 1953, 10-1-102, enacted by L.
U77, ch. 48, § 1.

10-1-103.

10-1-104

Meaning of "this act" — See § 10-1-101
and notes thereto.

Construction.

The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be liberally construed
flopennit the municipality to exercise the powers granted by this act except in
£ases clearly contrary to the intent of the law.
History: C. 1953, 10-1-103, enacted by L.
J977, ch. 48, § 1.

10-1-104.

Meaning of "this act." — See § 10-1-101
and notes thereto

Definitions.

S\s used in this act:
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class, city
of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah, but
unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not include
counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments.
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided:
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the
city commission;
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city council;
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council.
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities.
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in Section 10-2-301.
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to
town clerks.
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipality unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law.
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street, alley,
public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or other
public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality, by some
other political subdivision of the state or by the state.
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service
delivery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity.
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total
aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.
# (10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by
incorporated area of one or more municipalities.
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving more
than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per
259
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Service by mail, additional time after,
U.R.C.P. 6(e).
Third-party practice, U.R.C.R 14.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Filed depositions.
Service upon attorney.
—Presumption of authorization.
When service required.
—Default judgment.
Appeal.
Cited.
Filed depositions.
Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court
are presumptively public under the Utah Public and Private Wntings Act (former § 78-26-1
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be
kept secret only on a showing of good cause.
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P2d
1095 (Utah 1990).
Service upon attorney.
—Presumption of authorization.
Where defendant engaged attorney only to
file motion but never so notified court or attorney, appearance of attorney to file motion
raised presumption that he represented defendant in full action. Where defendant presented
no clear and convincing evidence to refute presumption, notice given to attorney of date set
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v.
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966).
When service required.
—Default judgment.
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defen-

dants of default judgment entered against
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656
P2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985
addition of reference to Rule 55).
Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the default
judgment to defendants did not invalidate the
default judgment when defendants received the
notice of default in time to move to set aside the
judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T.
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Appeal
Under former Rule 73(h), time for appeal
from default judgment in city court runs from
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v.
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,288 P.2d
786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d).
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. 0*Neil, 4
Utah 2d 270, 293 P2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v.
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 R2d 581
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 R2d 806
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 R2d 944 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at
Law § 6; 61AAm. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15;
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413.
A-LJL — Construction of phrase "usual

place of abode," or similar terms referring to
abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112.
Service of process by mail in international
civil action as permissible under Hague Convention, 112 A.L.R. Fed. 241.

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
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by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect, but it may not extend the time for taking any action
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the
extent and under the conditions stated m them
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the
continued existence or expiration of a term of court The continued existence or
expiration of a term of court m no way affects the power of a court to do any act
or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it
(d) For motions —Affidavits A written motion, other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and notice of the heanng thereof shall be served not later than
5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is
fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the court Such an order may
for cause shown be made on ex parte application When a motion is supported
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion, and, except as
otherwise provided m Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later
than 1 day before the heanng, unless the court permits them to be served at
some other time
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period
(Amended effective November 1, 1997 )
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment inserted "by CJA 4-501" in the first sentence of Subdivision (d)
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a), (b),
(d) and (e) of this rule are substantially similar
to Rule 6 F R C P
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision (b),
was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure
Cross References. — Amendment to pleadings to conform to evidence, time of motion for,
U R O P 15(b)
Commencement of action, time of service,
U R C P 4(b)
Corporation or association, mailing of process
to, U R.C P 4(e)(5)
Depositions, objections to errors and irregu
lanties, U R C P 32(c)
Discharge of attachment or release of property, U R C P 64C(f)
Documents for state or subdivision, filing
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3
Election laws, weekends and holidays included in computation of time, § 20A-1-401
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge
proceeding not affected, § 78-7 21

Juvenile Court Act, time computed according
to Rules of Cml Procedure § 78-3a-27
Legal hohdavs enumerated § 63-13-2
New trial, time of motion for after judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, U R C P 50(c)(2)
Order defined U R C P 7(b)(2)
Pleadings and other papers service by mail,
U R C P 5(b)(1)
Probate Code, mailing of notice of hearing,
§ 75-1-401
Reference to master time of first meeting of
parties after, U R C P 53(d)(1)
Relief from judgment or order, time for motion, U R C P 60
Rules by district courts, U R C P 83
Service by mail, U R C P 5(b)(1)
Substitution of parties, time of motion for,
U R C P 25
Summons mailed as alternative to personal
service, U R C P 4(g)
Time, how computed, § 68-3-7
Tribunal, board or office exceeding jurisdiction, notice, U R C P 65B(e)
Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely
filing, U R C P 12(k)
When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8
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Additional time after service by mail
—Administrative procedure
— Failure to add days
Waiver of objection
—Industrial Commission
Computation
—Months and years

Enlargement
—Motion for new trial
— Notice of appeal
Designation of record
—Redemption from execution sales
Motions and affidavits
—Applicability of rule
Court orders
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Part X. District Courts a n d Clerks
Rule
77 District courts and clerks.
78 to 80 Repealed
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Rule
83 Repealed
84 Forms
85 Title
A p p e n d i x Of F o r m s

P a r t XI. General P r o v i s i o n s
81 Applicability of rules in general
82 Jurisdiction and venue unaffected.

Index to Rules

PART I. SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION
Rule 1. General provisions.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the
state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except
as governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the
opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the
rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event
the former procedure applies.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1996.)
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amendment substituted "the courts" for a list of
courts, by level, near the beginning of Subdivision (a)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F R C P ,
except that it has been adapted to procedure of
this state
Cross R e f e r e n c e s . — Children's cases

deemed civil proceedings, § 78-3a-44.
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected
by rules, U.R C.P 82.
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district
courts, circuit courts, and justice courts, Title
78, Chapters 2, 2a, 3, 4, 5
Supreme Court rulemaking, § 78-2-4
United States, execution of process on land
acquired by, §§ 63-8-1, 63-8-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicability
—Administrative body
Federal rules
Noncompliance
Cited
Applicability.
—Administrative body.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to a proceeding before an administrative
body seeking to regulate activities burdened
with a public interest Entre Nous Club v
Tbronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P2d 670 (1955)
Federal rules.
Since these rules were fashioned after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it is proper to
examine decisions under the federal rules to
determine the meanings thereof Winegar v

Shm Olson, Inc , 122 Utah 487, 252 P 2 d 205
(1953) (construing Rule 41)
Noncompliance.
Noncompliance with rules is allowed only
when some inadvertence, surprise, excusable
neglect, or mistake has occurred, and deviation
is required for substantial justice to be done
Holton v Holton, 121 U t a h 451, 243 P 2 d 438
(1952)
Cited in Howard v Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149,
356 P2d 275 (1960), State v Geurts, 11 Utah 2d
345, 359 P 2 d 12 (1961), State ex rel Road
Comm'n v Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P2d 914
(1966), Ellis v Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 1 8 9 , 4 2 9 P 2 d
39 (1967), Bartholomew v Bartholomew, 548
P2d 238 (Utah 1976), Dixon v Stoddard, 765
P 2 d 879 (Utah 1988).

